The View from an Inferior Court

CARL McGOWAN*

This article was originally delivered as The Morrison Lecture
at the annual meeting of the CaliforniaState Bar Association in
October 1981. The author draws upon his more than eighteen
years experience as a judge "on a busy court of appeals"to comment on the problemsfacing today'sfederaljudiciary.
The title of this article is not intended to disparage the court on
which I sit. It derives rather from the statement in article II of
the Constitution that 'The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."'
I could, of course, perhaps have wished that the Framers, in accomplishing their great purposes in Philadelphia, had used some
word other than 'inferior." When a layman asks somebody what I
do, and is told that "He's an inferior court judge," there is a certain lurking ambiguity as to which noun the adjective may be
taken to modify. But the terminology of "superior" and "inferior"
courts was widely employed in the American colonies, familiar as
they were with the judicial hierarchies of the mother country; and
it was only natural that the word "inferior" should crop up in the
Constitution.
There was, thus, no problem in the Constitutional Convention
about the language appropriate for identifying the repositories of
the national judicial power. There was some difference of view as
to whether they should extend beyond the "one supreme Court"
created by article III, a respectable number of the delegates being
of the opinion that the courts of the new states would be fully ad*
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equate and competent to ascertain and apply federal law, subject
to the supervision of that "one supreme Court."2 The conflict was
resolved by the genius for constructive compromise which characterized the deliberations of that assembly. In this instance, the
compromise left to the Congress of the United States the decision
of what should be done about creating lower federal courts.
The first session of the new Congress acted promptly to answer
that question in the affirmative. Federal district courts were created to function at the trial level, and also three hybrid circuit
courts with both trial and appellate jurisdiction, the latter being
manned originally by a district judge and two Supreme Court Jus3
tices. This latter institution proved to be quite unsatisfactory,
and I will not pursue its tortured subsequent history.
The advent of the federal circuit courts of appeals as we know
them today came in 1890.4 One of the highlights of the debate in
Congress was an impassioned speech supporting the new departure by a Representative from Texas, in which he referred to the
"kingly power" of district judges.5 I have always suspected that,
then and since, many of the district judges must have regarded
the congressional action as simply creating a new tyranny of its
own, even as we on the courts of appeals, seeing our handiwork
demolished by an occasional thunderbolt from above, are tempted
sadly to reflect upon man's inhumanity to man. In any event, the
basic structure of the inferior federal courts was finally determined at that time, and it has remained essentially unaltered
down to the present moment.
We are less than ten years away from the one hundredth anniversary of the ultimate shaping of the structure of the federal judicial system. And within this speedily foreshortening decade of
the 1980's we will, in only six more years, be celebrating the bicentennial of the Constitution so miraculously wrought in the
Philadelphia of 1787. Surely we of the law in all of its manifestations owe it both to our profession and to our posterity to anticipate the searching reexamination which those significant milestones will inevitably stimulate.
The Chief Justice of the United States-a close and thoughtful
observer of the functioning of the federal judicial system both
2. See 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS
104-05, 124-25 (rev. ed. 1937).

OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at

3. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11-14 (1927).

4. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 43 (1976) (originally enacted as Circuit Court of Appeals

Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (based on Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 128, 36 Stat. 1133).
5. 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Culberson).
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from its pinnacle and from fourteen years of service on a court of
appeals-more than a year ago invited a prominent member of

the California Bar Association and federal circuit judge, The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, to focus his attention on the problems
of the system as they bid fair to take shape over the next ten to
twenty years. A first fruit of Judge Wallace's intense and scholarly labors has been the introduction in the Senate this past summer of a bill creating a Federal Courts Study Commission and a

Federal Courts Advisory Council on the Future of the Judiciary.6
The former is a legislative commission to study all aspects of the
functioning of the federal courts and to recommend desirable
changes, including revision, if necessary, of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the federal statutes. The Commission's life would be of limited duration, but the Council,
representing all three branches of the national government,
would be an ongoing body to protect and advance the effective operation of the federal judiciary at all its levels.
In seedng a subject worthy of the long and honorable tradition
of The. Morrison Lecture, it seemed to me that perhaps the most
useful thing I could do would be, from the vantage point of more
than eighteen years on a busy court of appeals, to formulate my
own impressions of how the system is working and what perhaps
could be done to meet its most urgent needs, now and in the foreseeable future.
Overshadowing all else is, of course, the central and overriding
phenomenon of growth in the sheer volume of cases crowding in
upon the federal system at each of its three tiers. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has recently made projections of future growth to the year 2000, based both on the years
from 1900 to 1980, and the more immediate period from 1975 to
1980 when the growth curve sharply rose.7 Each produces results
that are virtually stupendous in terms of, first, the number of
filings that may be expected, and second, the number of new
judgeships that will be required.
But everything in this country seems to be getting bigger, and
all of our social and governmental institutions have had constantly to devise new methods of coping. Growth alone, therefore,
6. S. 1530, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

7. See ADnusTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
THE DIRECTOR 216 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
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does not necessarily dictate what those methods should be. The
courts have not been behindhand in focusing upon the intrinsic
importance of various classes of cases, and developing more summary means of dealing with those cases, for example, where only
the parties, and not the world at large, need to be told why the
court reached the result it did. Thus, my court, like the Ninth Circuit and others, has resorted increasingly to brief and unpublished memoranda attached to the judginents which are not to be
cited except for invocation of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
One thing that growth has made imperative, however, is very
high quality indeed in the making of judicial appointments. There
was a time, and not so long ago, when a court could carry on its
back a weak appointee, but those days are gone. The judges must
today have confidence in the abilities of each other, in order that
the useful principle of the division of labor eliminating undue duplication of effort may be employed. The appointment of a judge
who cannot gain that confidence is disastrous for the effective
functioning of the entire court.
My own observation is that the appointing authority has become increasingly responsive to that fact, particularly when great
reliance is placed upon the Attorney General who is, after all, the
single biggest litigant in the federal courts and for whom, in common with all other litigants, the competence of the judges is of
critical importance. At the same time, many more Senators than
formerly have gotten the true religion on this score and their recommendations, thanks in large part to the influence of the organized bar, have become more responsible.
We are presently in the first year of a new appointing authority,
and as always, the first appointments are the center of great public attention. My judicial years have embraced more than one of
these transitions. My experience has uniformly and happily been
that, if the new judge is a good lawyer and intellectually honest,
the matter of pre-judicial preferences and ideologies tends to take
care of itself in the shift of attention from abstract principles to
the records of individual cases.
This is surely one of the factors that have contributed to the
surprisingly large degree of cohesiveness that characterizes the
functioning of the federal courts of appeals, as indicated by the
statistics showing relatively infrequent dissents and few occasions necessitating reexamination by the entire court sitting en
banc of the result reached by a three-judge panel.8 There are
8. See J. HoWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 189221 (1981).
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other influences of an informal nature that also work to this end.
Any serious prospect for a court of appeals appointment is, almost by definition, serious in his or her own attitude towards the
law as a profession; and the judges as a group tend to share similar backgrounds of legal experience and common values in terms
of their personal perceptions of the role a judge should play. Further, unlike the district judge who knows both the loneliness and
the independence of the single decision-maker, the appellate
judges participate in a collective process which exerts its own
constraints through traditions of personal civility and reasoning
together in conference discussions.
The view from a court of appeals extends in one direction towards the district court whose work it reviews, and, of course, to
the administrative agencies whose product in the main comes to
it directly. In the other direction, that view is fixedly upon the
Supreme Court: The trial courts and agencies perform functions
quite different from those of an appellate court, and thus they do
not present the comparative interest that one appellate court
quite naturally has in another, especially when the latter possesses the ultimate power of decision.
In looking at the Supreme Court, a federal intermediate appellate judge is likely to note carefully some significant differences.
First and foremost is the extent to which the Supreme Court controls its own docket. Since Chief Justice Taft was successful in
pushing through Congress the certiorari legislation in 1925,9 the
Court has seen even further reductions in the appeals coming to
it as of right, and further steps in this direction are not only desirable but likely. For the courts of appeals, however, there is no
discretion to deny review in respect of any of the appeals that are
flooding it.
Appellate courts are customarily thought of as having two principal functions. One is essentially supervisory in the sense that it
is directed to the correction of error in the application of existing
law by the district court or agency under review. The other is the
"making" of law to govern situations where either there is no existing law to apply, or such law as does apply should be changed
to the extent that it is within the reviewing court's power to do so.
A consequence of the Supreme Court's increasing power to control its docket is that the mere fact that a lower court decision is
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).

wrong is not enough to assure a grant of review in competition
with other cases where definitive law needs to be established.
The Supreme Court's lawmaking role has, thus, caused its supervisory error-correcting role to diminish. By contrast, the courts of
appeals, with no docket control power, are heavily in the business
of correcting decisional errors, although inevitable gaps in
Supreme Court doctrine and in the reach of statutes, as well as
express statutory language in some cases, leave them with large
"lawmaking" responsibilities also. Needless to say, a court of appeals with too many cases to handle experiences severe tensions
in trying to meet both of these responsibilities.
Those tensions have invited resolution by increasing resort in
the courts of appeals to assembly line expedients which do not
satisfy the public and the practicing bar any more than they do
the judges themselves. I know that my own participation in the
decisional process has changed markedly since my first ten years
and more on the bench. That participation is much less intellectually satisfying than formerly because there is too much paper
shuffling and too little time for personal involvement in research
and reflection. It is the same discomfort I used to feel as a practicing lawyer whenever I got over-extended.
The time has surely come, therefore, to give careful consideration to changes, however novel and far-reaching, that will check
the proliferation of both cases and judges. The call to action in
this regard was sounded by Justice Brandeis when, as long ago as
the time the certiorari bill was enacted for the Supreme Court in
1925, he wrote a letter to Professor Felix Frankfurter of the
Harvard Law School. The Supreme Court, said Justice Brandeis,
was "venerated throughout the land" because "the official coat
has been cut according to the human cloth."o Contrarily, lower
federal courts were "all subject to criticism and or execration""
by reason of the fact that their work loads surpassed "their
human limitations."12

Fifty years and more later, the cutting of that coat, in Justice
Brandeis's phrase, or, as in the words of Judge Henry Friendly,
"averting the flood by lessening the flow," is of the greatest urgency.13 A well-conceived and discriminating program to that end
is clearly the first order'of federal judicial business today.
High on any such agenda is the elimination of diversity jurisdic10. Letter from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frandurter, Feb. 6, 1925, quoted in .
HOWARD, COURTS OF

APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL

JuDIciAL SYSTEM 262 (1981).

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV.

634 (1974).
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tion. The incidence of that jurisdiction is substantial, inasmuch
as diversity suits account for one-fourth of the civil dockets of the
district courts and one-sixth of the civil appeals filed in the courts
of appeals.' 4 Chief Justice Warren in 1959 specifically requested
the American Law Institute to undertake a study of the proper allocation of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts. 5
That study was carried out by the most expert assistance available. Squarely in the final target sight was the diversity
jurisdiction.
The Institute, although disposed to believe that complete elimination was desirable, decided, as a matter of tactics, to restrict its
proposal for the time being to prevent any citizen of a state from
invoking diversity jurisdiction in that state. But even that limited
proposal, to which there could seem to be no rational opposition
in view of the original justification for diversity as protecting outof-state parties against local prejudice, was opposed by the bar
generally. The passage of time saw some movement towards total
elimination, and the House of Representatives passed a bill to
6
that effect in 1978, but the Senate did not take it up.'

Since federal jurisdiction is not a subject of much interest to
the -ordinary citizen, the Congressmen are in the position of
knowing that voting to eliminate diversity jurisdiction will not win
them any votes, but will doubtless cost them some among the
lawyers who, by simply remaining silent, effectively signal their
wish to retain access to the federal courts. Unless and until the
organized bar is prepared to affirmatively endorse the dropping of
diversity, it appears unlikely that anything will happen.
The federal courts, whose reason for being is to declare federal
law and to assure its uniformity and supremacy, obviously have
more pressing things to do than to try to ascertain what state law
is and to apply it in private civil cases. There is also no evidence
that local prejudice against non-residents is a problem of the
dimensions that it was thought to be as the country moved away
from the colonial era.
I respectfully suggest that it is wholly irrational for professional
interest and convenience to be made a standard for the allocation
14. See ANEuAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 227.
15. See C. McGowAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES 84-85 (1969).

16. I.

9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).

of jurisdiction between state and federal courts. And most especially is this so in California which possesses one of the strongest
and most distinguished state court systems in the entire nation.
The Conference of State Chief Justices, although initially concerned about the added caseload, has more recently adopted a
resolution certifying that the state courts are ready, willing, and
able to take over the job. Only the organized bar stands in the
way, and anyone genuinely concerned with federal justice can
only hope that this barrier will soon begin to be breached.
If diversity jurisdiction is to continue, then it seems to me that
such cases should be prime candidates for inclusion under any
system in contemplation for discretionary leave to appeal in the
federal courts of appeals. This concept, which obviously would be
partially responsive to Justice Brandeis's concerns, is being increasingly articulated by some of our most perceptive judges.
Judge Friendly some years ago proposed discretionary review of
administrative agency actions which have been reviewed in the
first instance by a district court.17 Social Security claims and
challenged personnel actions would be obvious candidates for
such treatment, as would also the burgeoning field of Freedom of
Information Act appeals. Chief Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit
recently published a thoughtful proposal that Judge Friendly's
suggestion be expanded to include all civil cases that appear to be
insubstantial or in which the district court opinion appears on its
face to be correct as a matter of fact or law.' 8 The petition for
leave to review procedure which he contemplates is carefully circumscribed in such a manner as to assure that any appeal of significance will be given plenary hearing and consideration.
In the justifiable concern that has sparked the movement to
give the Supreme Court virtually complete control of its docket,
the comparable need of the courts of appeals for relief of a similar
nature has, I suggest, been neglected. Such relief for the courts of
appeals cannot be anything as extensive because, as Justice Stevens-who has served at both levels of the federal appellate system-said in an opinion earlier this year:. "The federal judicial
system is undergoing profound changes. Among the most significant is the increase in the importance of our Courts of Appeals.
Today they are in truth the courts of last resort for almost all federal litigation."19
The fact is that, just as the guarantee in the Constitution of jury
17. See H. FRIENDLY,FEDERAL

JURIsDIcTION: A GENERAL "ViEw176-77

(1973).

18. See Lay, A Proposalfor DiscretionaryReview in the FederalCourts of Appeal, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151 (1981).
19. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 275 (1981).
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trial in any civil suit involving more than twenty dollars has a
marked air of unreality about it these days, so must there be
some erosion of the long-established assumption that every litigant is entitled to at least one plenary appeal. The Constitution
does not undergird that assumption, as witness the fact that Congress was nearly a century late in providing adequate appeals in
federal criminal cases. I do not suggest any retreat in that field,
but there are vast differences in the nature and importance of the
civil cases that are presently appealable as of right. The Republic
will not founder or the liberties of the citizen be destroyed if carefully considered limitations on that right begin to make their
appearance.
A matter that has rankled relations between state and federal
courts for some years now is the collateral attack on final state
criminal convictions provided by Congress in the federal courts. 20
A state prisoner who has unsuccessfully exhausted his avenues of
state trial and appellate relief can, even many years later when
retrial is not practically feasible, attack that conviction in the federal district court as violative of federal law, and procure his release if such a violation is established. Since the same claim of
federal law violation can, and often is, made in the trial and appellate courts of the state, with certiorari review available in the
Supreme Court, the state judges understandably have some difficulty in seeing why their work should be reexamined in the federal courts whenever a colorable claim of violation is alleged.
The one place where this cannot be done is in the District of
Columbia. For many years the District of Columbia had a municipal court whose criminal jurisdiction was limited to misdemeanors. All felonies proscribed in the District of Columbia Code were
tried in the United States District Court, although they consisted
of the typical state crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary, assault, and so on. Some twelve years ago Congress enacted a comprehensive reorganization of both the local and
federal courts in the District of Columbia which, expressly analogizing the District of Columbia to a state, provided that such offenses should be tried in a greatly enlarged and strengthened
state court system, which is today one of the best in the nation. 2 1
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
21. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.

A person charged with a felony under the D.C. Code is indicted
by a state grand jury, tried in a new Superior Court of general
civil and criminal jurisdiction, and has an appeal to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals which is now the supreme court for
the residents of the District of Columbia and whose judgments
are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court as in
the case of any other state supreme court.
In doing all this, the Congress, tracking the language of the collateral attack section of the U.S. Code, provided in the D.C. Code
for collateral attack upon a D.C. criminal conviction to be made in
the new and improved D.C. court system. 22 It explicitly declared,
however, that no further collateral challenge could be made in the
federal courts in the District of Columbia.23 Thus it is that for
some years now, although a state prisoner across the Potomac in
Virginia, or one over the line in Maryland, has a second chance
for collateral review of his conviction in the federal courts in
those states, a state prisoner in the District of Columbia does not.
This seeming anomaly was challenged on constitutional
grounds in the federal courts in the District, but the Supreme
Court ultimately held that Congress could constitutionally make
the choice it did, articulating that result in terms which would appear to give Congress the same latitude to end in all of the states
collateral attack by state prisoners in the federal courts.24 There
have been no reports, so far as I am aware, of egregious injustices
to District of Columbia prisoners because of this denial of state
habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts, although it would be
useful if a careful study were made of the collateral attack cases
heard and disposed of by the District of Columbia courts over the
last decade. If such a study were to show no horror stories of federal rights denied, as appears to me likely, then Congress might
well consider the abolition of collateral attack by state prisoners
in the federal courts, at least in certain kinds of cases.
The early finality of criminal convictions is generally desirable,
and especially so when that can be assured without duplication of
judicial effort. The resources of the federal courts at the present
time are strained by their own criminal caseloads. They should
not have to exercise a supervisory authority over the administration of state criminal laws unless that is plainly necessary in the
interest of justice.
Certainly there appears to have been a steadily increasing sensitivity by state judges to claims of federal right-a sensitivity
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-110 (1981).

23. Id., § 23-110(g).
24. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
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that can only be frustrated by needless subjection to secondguessing by federal judges. Since Congress has in effect made
the District of Columbia a laboratory for testing the need for federal collateral attack by state prisoners, the Congress would do
well to study carefully the actual results of that experient. HE it
turns out to be positive, then the opportunity exists to eliminate
simultaneously a significant number of cases from the federal
courts and a condition which has always roiled the waters of federal-state relations.
Many thoughtful observers of the current operations of the federal judicial system have, over the last several years, come to believe that there is a need for increased appellate capacity at the
highest level. At the last Term of the Supreme Court, 154 cases
were orally argued, and 144 were disposed of by full signed
25
opinions.
It has become increasingly clear that, whether the Supreme
Court annually receives 4,000 or 10,000 certiorari petitions and appeals as of right, only about 150 cases, give or take a few more or
less each year, will be given plenary treatment. This seems to be
the figure which the Supreme Court has, several years ago, tacitly
determined as constituting its capacity for such treatment.
Although circuit judges naturally experience feelings of gratification and relief when certiorari is denied in important and difficult cases they have decided, all of us know that many of such
cases warranted authoritative Supreme Court resolution in order
that federal law shall be uniform and definitive throughout the
nation. This is especially true in cases where there is conflict
among the circuits.
Given the policy and practice of the Internal Revenue Service
not to acquiesce in circuit decisions it believes to be wrong, and to
await the opportunity to seek a different result in another circuit,
it is literally possible for taxpayers in one circuit to pay their
taxes on a different and more favorable basis than the taxpayers
in another. This is wholly at variance with the concept of equality
of treatment under the law, and perpetuates injustice until the
Supreme Court finds it possible, if it ever does, to get around to
resolving the conflict. Since tax cases tend not to involve constitutional questions but only interpretations of the frequently ar25. See 50 U.S.L.W. 3044 (Aug. 11, 1981) (statistical recap of the Court's workload during the last three terms).

cane and convoluted rhetoric of the Internal Revenue Code, there
is no compelling reason why the Supreme Court's energies
should be diverted from its overriding responsibility to settle the
law of the Constitution.
Going back to the report of the Freund Commission a decade
ago, 26 there have been repeated proposals that there be some
mechanism by which the Supreme Court could delegate the job of
resolving inter-circuit conflicts, and perhaps other types of less
important cases as well. A distinguished and expert legislative
commission headed by Senator Hruska recommended such a step
a few years back,27 and only this summer Senator Heflin, a former
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court and an effective judicial reformer in his state, introduced a bill to the same end. 28
Such proposals have thus far gotten nowhere. But, in my judgment, this has been true because the suggestions have been unnecessarily ambitious in their preoccupation with the creation of
an entirely new institution to be known as a National Court of Appeals. Movement in this direction can and should, in my view, be
more tentative and experimental in character, with reliance for
the time being on existing judicial resources rather than the creation of a new institution with newly appointed judges of its own.
The ill-fated Commerce Court created in the second decade of
this century argues strongly against summoning such an institution into being on an independent and permanent basis.29
No one knows, for example, the degree of use the Supreme
Court would make of a case referral power. I suspect that it
would approach such a power gingerly in the first instance, and
that the number of referrals made by it would be few indeed until, if and when, it gains confidence in the value and efficacy of
such a new and striking departure in the discharge of its decisional responsibilities. A new court staffed by newly-appointed
judges might well have precious little to do, with growing doubts
in the community at large about the wisdom and expense of
bringing the new tribunal into being. Under such circumstances,
dismantlement would be painful, and also cast a cloud over the
future experimentation which surely ought to be the order of the
day in grappling with the problems of skyrocketing litigation.
How much more sensible it would seem to be to create a temporary court with an experienced judge from each circuit to receive
26. See Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A. J. 247

(1973).
27. See Hruska, The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System: A Legislative History, 1974 Am. ST. L.J. 579, 585-98.
28. S. 1529, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
29. See F. FRANKFMTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 153-74.
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and dispose of such referrals as the Supreme Court chooses to
make. This device, unlike the Commerce Court, has served the
federal judiciary-and the nation-very well indeed. This was
true of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals set up by
Congress in World War II to handle disputes under price control
legislation.3 0 It is true of the current Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals functioning in the energy field.31 It is true of the
District Court Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,3 2 which is
the "traffic cop" for directing the flow of claims being asserted simultaneously in multiple district courts throughout the country,
and of the Special Railroad Court under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.33 These tribunals all functioned as needed, and
the judges assigned to them were not detached from their regular
courts. No new courthouses were required, and the extra expense
to the system was minimal.
Starting with a court of this character, and confining its jurisdiction in the first instance to receiving referrals from the Supreme
Court of inter-circuit conflicts, is the best way to edge into this
ticklish enlargement of our federal appellate capacity. It is also
the one most likely to command, for its necessary legislative authorization, the support of the Supreme Court, the federal judges
generally, and the legal community.
A provisional approach of this kind assures that the continuance of such a court will turn solely on the degree of its utilization and its effectiveness. in performance. Its termination, if that
should prove to be the popular verdict, would be uncomplicated.
If it should, contrarily, come to be regarded by the Supreme
Court as a helpful adjunct in its task of assuring the uniformity
and supremacy of federal law, then that will be time enough to
consider enlarging the referral power to include other kinds of
cases, and the establishment of a new and separate judicial institution. In either event, the value of proceeding experimentally
and tentatively in seeking solutions to some of our present
problems will have been vindicated.
Turning to the matter of jurisdiction, it is important to recognize that there are distinctly wrong as well as right ways of altering the current allocation of judicial power between the state and
30. See 299 F.2d 1 (1961). The court held its final session on December 6, 1961.
31. See ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 213.

32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
33. See ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 213.

the federal courts. Falling into the former category, in my submission, are the bills pending in the present Congress to put certain specific constitutional issues beyond the reach of the federal
courts. 34 These bills are multiple in number, as well as various in

their approaches. Some are addressed to both the inferior federal
courts and the Supreme Court, and some only to the one or the
other. It is enough for present purposes to deal only with those
confined to the Supreme Court, because they pose the most serious danger to our constitutional system.
First let me say that it is not only the ordinary citizen who periodically feels disappointment and frustration with particular
Supreme Court rulings. That is the frequent position of an inferior court judge who sees his best effort rejected on high. But deep
down we know that it is essential to constitutional government
that there be one ultimate voice, and that it be not stilled on any
significant question affecting the rights and liberties of any and all
of our people under the protection of the Constitution. We also
know that the Constitution itself provides the means by which
any Supreme Court reading of that document that is unacceptable to two-thirds of each House of Congress, and to three-fourths
of the state legislatures, may be nullified, that being the particular
amending device by which three Supreme Court decisions in our
35
history have been overcome.
The present proposals in Congress, in contrast, contemplate
that a simple majority in each House of Congress, together with
approval by the President, are enough to foreclose consideration
by the Supreme Court of such issues as school prayers and busing, abortion, and an all-male draft. The authority for such selective reductions in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is
said to reside in Article III's grant of such jurisdiction "with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
6
make." 3
Whether such a claim is founded upon a correct reading of
those words is a tangled and complex question which, I believe it
fair to say, no one can presently answer with complete assurance.
Plausible arguments can be, and are, made both ways. What is
certain is that Congress only once has acted, overriding a presidential veto, to compel the Supreme Court to address the ques34. See, e.g., S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 311, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
35. The three instances are: 1) the llth amendment overruled Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); 2) the 14th amendment overruled Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); and 3) the 16th amendment overruled Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1888).

36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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tion, and that was in the troubled Reconstruction Era
immediately following the Civil War. And that case, Ex parte McCardle,37 is viewed by many constitutional scholars as giving only
a partial answer that is itself arguably inconclusive in respect of
factual circumstances different from those that obtained in that
case.
There is nothing new about the present efforts in Congress to
diminish the Supreme Court by legislative incursions upon its appellate jurisdiction. Daniel Webster, successively as chairman of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, successfully fended
off such forays during the period of popular ascendancy following
upon the Jackson Administration in the mid-19th century.3 8 In
the 1950's, hostility to the Warren Court in some quarters of the
Congress mounted a major attack to this end, but the organized
bar-led by the American Bar Association-rallied in time to turn
back that assault in a manner reminiscent of the way that responsible lawyers of all shades of opinion formed an impregnable protective phalanx against Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing
proposal at the time when his political power was at its very
peak. 39
On those occasions the lawyers did not fall back to purely defensive positions that the Congress could not constitutionally do
what was proposed. Instead, they counter-attacked on grounds of
wise public policy, that is to say, what is best for the country in
terms of the scheme of government embodied in the Constitution.
Even if the exceptions clause be taken to contain the power over
the Supreme Cout's appellate jurisdiction that some claim for it,
there is still the question of whether the exercise of that power by
Congress is in the public interest.
In pressing policy and practical objectives to the pending legislation in recent testimony before a congressional committee, Professor William Van Alstyne, of the Duke University Law School,
noted the "chaos of constitutional uncertainty" that would result,
and stated that "the best reason here, in Congress," (for rejecting
the proposed legislation) is that Congress should "not welcome a
fragmented Constitution of the United States of no national
supremacy at all, but merely a ludicrous document of vagrant
37. 74 U.S. (1 WaHl.) 506 (1869).
38. See generally 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTORY 686-728 (1922).
39. See generally P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME CoURT 189-90 (1969).

'meanings' unreviewably determined by state courts ....

"40

Once again the organized bar, with the American Bar Association in the forefront, is deploying its forces in support of the
Supreme Court by urging Congress not to enact the bills in question. Certainly that course would commend itself to a President
of the United States who, in vetoing in 1868 the only bill of this
nature that has ever been enacted, said:
In public estimation, it [the Supreme Court] combines judicial wisdom
and impartiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to the

Constitution; and any act which may be construed into or mistaken for an
attempt to prevent or evade its decisions on a question which affects the
liberty of the citizens and agitates
4 1 the country cannot fail to be attended
with unpropitious consequences.

The nation would have been better served if those words had
been heeded by the Congress to which they were addressed.
They merit the careful attention of the present Congress, and of
all of us.

40. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1981) (statement of Prof. William Van
Alstyne).
41. Veto of President Andrew Johnson (Mar. 23, 1868), quoted in 2 C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT iN UNfED STATES HisTORY 477 (1922).

